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Abstract
Energy use in buildings remains a significant part of overall 
energy demand. Deep renovation projects, delivered at scale, 
remain a challenging task to achieve a lower carbon building 
stock. The complexity of building renovation is related to inher-
ent characteristics of buildings, which require distinct project 
management techniques. While there are now more projects 
focusing on achieving operational performance, there is still 
very little research on the management of the renovation and 
retrofit process itself – this paper aims to contribute to that 
literature.
First, the policy context for renovation is briefly set out. 
Then five different approaches to building renovation are dis-
tinguished: whole house; fabric first; room-by-room, step-by-
step, measure-by-measure. These categories provide the basis 
for analysis of the risk of there being a gap between designed 
and actual energy performance. In addition, ten stages of ret-
rofit are set out, and three different types of risk at each stage 
distinguished: assessment, sequence, and communication. 
Combining this typology of risks with the work stages and 
types of retrofit, the risks associated with renovation processes 
and technologies were estimated using evidence from cases 
studies of deep retrofits across the UK and EU. Risks are not 
restricted to just one retrofit type, nor are they found solely or 
predominantly in a small number of work stages. Risk man-
agement needs to be integrated into retrofit works, whichever 
approach is taken, at all stages and across the assessment, se-
quencing and communication aspects of the retrofit. Getting 
retrofit right will involve sophisticated strategies, and will re-
quire multiple innovations, which could include new manage-
ment systems, new documents (e.g. Building Passports) and 
new professional practices, with implications for education and 
training. Minimising the energy performance gap will only be 
achieved with increased focus on this hitherto neglected aspect 
of deep retrofit.
Introduction
Buildings are responsible for approximately 40  % of energy 
use and 36 % of carbon dioxide emissions in the EU. Reducing 
energy use and carbon emissions from this sector is crucial to 
delivering EU and member states’ commitments to meet car-
bon reduction goals. Because of the long lifetime of buildings, 
and the poor energy efficiency of much of the building stock, 
the main route to reducing energy use is through renovation 
of existing buildings. The scale of challenge, particularly taking 
into account the Paris Agreement aspiration of keeping global 
temperature rise below 1.5 °C (UNFCCC 2015), means that 
the focus is increasingly on ‘deep’ renovation – a process 
which results in the energy use and carbon emissions 
from buildings being very substantially reduced.
However, deep renovation projects are inherently complex, 
with many risks attached. Badly managed renovation can have 
very poor outcomes in terms of energy performance – the ‘en-
ergy performance gap’- and in extreme cases can damage the 
buildings they were supposed to improve. In the UK, there have 
been examples of poor quality solid wall insulation projects, 
funded through a government-mandated schemes, resulting in 
7-349-19 TOPOUZI ET AL
1346 ECEEE 2019 SUMMER STUDY
7. MAKE BUILDINGS POLICIES GREAT AGAIN
very serious damp and mould problems, negatively affecting 
people’s health and quality of life, as well as causing extensive 
property damage (De Selincourt 2018). This clearly highlights 
that if governments are promoting retrofit and deep retrofit, 
they need to put in place policies to manage the risks involved. 
Prior to doing this, there needs to be a clear understanding of 
the risks involved. This paper aims to characterise the process 
risks involved in deep retrofit and to suggest how these risks 
can be minimised, across a range of approaches to deep retrofit, 
and with reference to current policy developments. While this 
analysis is believed to be relevant across the EU, the evidence 
and examples used in this paper, come primarily from the UK.
The focus here is on project delivery: the design and installa-
tion of technology and new materials to an existing building in 
order to improve its energy performance. This is distinct from 
other topics which have been studied in relation to retrofit: the 
management of retrofit programmes and schemes (e.g. Rose-
now and Galvin 2013, Rosenow and Eyre 2016, Galvin and 
Sunikka-Blank 2017, Greenwood, Congreve et al. 2017, Gillich, 
Sunikka-Blank et al. 2018); the configuration of consortia of 
partners to deliver retrofit projects (e.g.Mlecnik, Kondratenko 
et al. 2012, Mlecnik, Straub et al. 2019); studies of operational 
energy use (e.g. Gram-Hanssen 2008, Institute for Sustainabili-
ty 2012, Gupta and Dantsiou 2013, Topouzi 2015, Gram-Hans-
sen and Georg 2018); consumer perspectives and priorities in 
home renovation projects (e.g. Gram-Hanssen 2013, WILSON, 
CHRYSSOCHOIDIS et al. 2013 ). 
Managing and planning processes for retrofit vary consider-
ably between projects not only because of the variety of sizes, 
measures and approaches but also because of the lack of stand-
ard requirements or guidance in the UK about who can carry 
out retrofit projects or how such projects should be managed. 
A retrofit project can be delivered by a full project team of 
project managers, designers, energy consultants, contractors 
etc. (Topouzi 2015); or by one or more contractors working 
together in one of several possible contracting arrangements 
(Maby and Owen 2015). In some cases, the property owner 
has played multiple roles – client, designer, project manager, 
energy consultant, labourer, specialist installer (Fawcett and 
Killip 2014).
Fawcett (2013), showed how retrofit can be delivered as an 
integrated ‘whole home’ project where multiple interventions 
are carried out together, but can also following a phased ‘over 
time’ model (step-by-step smaller projects with pauses in 
between). It has been estimated that existing market demand 
for ‘over time’ projects in the UK represent approximately 
€10 bn worth of opportunities each year for incorporating low-
energy works at the same time as work is carried out for other 
(non-energy) reasons (Killip 2011, Owen, Mitchell et al. 2014). 
There is clearly a tension between design standards and market 
opportunity.
Professional guides all exist for project design, management 
and good practice in contracting between partners, but they are 
designed primarily for new construction projects, not work on 
existing buildings. Topouzi, Killip et al. (2017), argued that the 
very nature of retrofit projects adds additional sources of un-
certainty and risk, which need to be managed, supporting the 
development of a revised retrofit-specific version of the Plan of 
Work published by the Royal Institution of British Architects 
(RIBA). This new plan of work importantly identifies three 
work stages in retrofit (the Appraisal, pre-construction and 
Repair/Maintenance stages), which do not have equivalents in 
new construction projects. This paper uses the retrofit-specific 
Plan of Work to analyse evaluation data from field trials of am-
bitious deep low-carbon retrofits in the UK in 2009–12 (the 
Retrofit for the Future programme). 
The paper is structured as follows: first, the current European 
and UK policy for retrofit and deep retrofit is briefly described. 
Then we set out the different deep retrofit approaches that were 
trialled in the Retrofit for the Future (RfF) programme. This is 
followed by a description of the revisions to the RIBA Plan of 
Work, including the new work-stages for retrofit. The analy-
sis involves interpretation of evaluation data in order to assign 
risk profiles (low, medium, high) for the process of retrofit, as 
evidenced in the RfF trials. The paper closes with a discussion 
and conclusions. 
Policy context
In addition to the Paris Agreement signed by all EU Member 
states to restrict climate change to 1.5 C of warming, recently 
the EU has set carbon emissions reductions goals for all mem-
ber states for short-term (2030), mid-term (2040) and long-
term (2050) national energy efficiency renovation policies. 
With a view to the long-term goals for 80–95 reductions com-
pared to 1990 at EU level, the aim for all individual members 
is set towards highly energy efficient and decarbonised build-
ing stocks, and transformation into nearly zero-energy build-
ings. In this, two key directives -the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive (recently recast) and the Energy Efficiency 
Directive- set the requirements for national policy strategies 
(European Commission 2018). Each member state has set a 
roadmap with measures to mobilise and increase investment 
in the renovation of their residential building stock, and stimu-
lates cost-effective ‘deep’ renovations. Measurable progress in-
dicators domestically established assess in each member state 
the national milestones and actions achieved towards EU reno-
vation targets. Although at EU-level, requirements indicate the 
mechanisms for financial measures to energy efficiency links 
to: the quality of the renovation works; the performance of 
the equipment or material used for the renovation; the level 
of certification or qualification of the installer; an energy audit 
and transparency of the assessment method, national policies 
(European Commission 2018). Implementation varies between 
member states.
In the UK for instance, the tools to support building owners’ 
decision-making in favour of deep renovation are few and far 
between. Although not explicitly focused on deep renovation, 
concerns about ensuring the quality of retrofit in the UK’s reno-
vation strategy have been recognised. In an independent review 
of the Government’s housing renovation strategy, quality risks 
arose as one of several issues related to implementation of ret-
rofit schemes for mobilise retrofit investment (Bonfield 2016). 
In response, a new retrofit standard called PAS2035, currently 
in development, addresses technical and retrofit process issues 
related to the supply chain, product efficiency, installation qual-
ity and skills. In theory, this standard will cover the full range of 
renovation and deep renovation approaches and will be man-
datory in renovations funded via the government-mandated 
Energy Company Obligation scheme.
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A relatively new idea, ‘Building renovation passports’ is gain-
ing support in several European countries, and is mentioned 
as a possible supporting policy for long-term renovation strat-
egies in the revisions to the Energy Performance of Building 
Directive (Fabbri, de Groote et al. 2016, EuroACE 2018, Eu-
ropean Commission 2018). This passport is a document (pa-
per or electronic), which outlines a long-term (up to 20 year) 
step-by-step renovation roadmap for specific buildings based 
on a high quality on-site audit. The idea is that it is prepared 
in consultation with the building owner and ensures that the 
full energy efficiency potential of the building is achieved. The 
idea has been under development in Germany for some years 
and is currently being piloted in Germany, France and Flanders 
(Belgium) (Fabbri 2017). 
Deep retrofit approaches
The primary evidence for this paper comes from monitoring 
and evaluation of field trials of ambitious ‘deep’ retrofit in the 
UK in 2009–2013 under the Retrofit for the Future (RfF) pro-
gramme. In total, 119  low-rise houses underwent ambitious 
retrofit projects, where the aim was to test the viability of en-
ergy performance standards of 17 kgCO2/m2/year (115 kWh/
m2/year primary energy consumption), which is roughly 
equivalent to an 80 % reduction in emissions from an aver-
age UK house. Up to £150,000 (approximately 180,000 euros 
at 2012  exchange rates) was available per house, including 
technical monitoring. The RfF programme is still the only UK 
field trial of any significant scale to test such ambitious energy 
renovation standards for existing homes.
The published official evaluation for RfF comprises a short 
summary report and a database of projects, but this dataset is 
supplemented by detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of a sub-set of 26 of the RfF projects (Topouzi 2015).
The RfF projects reflected different broad approaches, rang-
ing from fully integrated ‘whole house’ projects, where multiple 
interventions were carried out in one go – through to less dis-
ruptive and costly approaches delivered in phases, and which 
can be categorised as ‘over time’ or staged. The RfF projects 
included three different ‘one off ’ approaches – ‘whole house’ 
‘fabric-first’ and ‘room-by-room’. Other approaches to retrofit 
can be characterized as ‘step-by-step’ and ‘measure-by-meas-
ure’. These are described in Table 1, which also illustrates the 
different variants between different approaches as identified in 
the literature.
The selection of retrofit approach often depends on clients’ 
financial and lifestyle constraints. In the UK, one-off interven-
tions combining ‘whole-house’, ‘room-by-room’ and ‘fabric-
first’ refurbishment approaches were tested in large pilot deep 
retrofit projects in social housing (e.g. Retrofit for the Future 
(TSB (2014)). Owner-occupied housing largely involves over-
time ‘step-by-step’ and ‘measure-by-measure’ retrofit interven-
tions, which can be driven by existing policy and regulation 
and do not usually involve thorough medium to long-term low-
carbon improvement plans (Fawcett, 2014).
The retrofit Plan of Work
In new buildings, the construction process involves certain 
established normative practices in planning and management 
that all projects need to follow, independent of their size, tar-
gets or energy efficiency scope. The critical problem in retrofits 
is the inherent complexity in project management, compared to 
new build. The whole process does not start with an empty site 
and is not delineated by well-established work stages. Retrofit 
works can start at any stage of an established process (e.g. in 
the UK Plan of Work RIBA 2013). This can either be planned 
starting with an assessment, design brief and followed by all 
design-construction-handover stages; or can be triggered by 
a single replacement starting just at construction stage miss-
ing out the impact this intervention has on the whole building 
performance (Figure 1). Within a retrofit process the causes 
of underperformance tend to arise and re-occur within mul-
tiple stages. In the UK established project work frameworks 
for project planning of existing and new buildings, like the 
RIBA and the Soft Landings framework (RIBA 2013, BSRIA 
Table 1. Categorization of five approaches to retrofit.
Retrofit 
approach
Description One 
off
Over 
time
Whole house Sees the building as a system of different elements/interfaces and users that interact 
with each other. The retrofit is not a replacement of individual measures and systems 
that are independent of each other and from users’ practices and lifestyle. 
X X
Fabric first Prioritises interventions that maximise the performance of components and materials 
of the building fabric (e.g. insulation and air-tightness measures), before considering 
the use of other heating and ventilation building services. 
X X
Room-by-room Undertakes interventions for a room at a time, addressing upgrading guidance of 
energy efficiency measures like insulation or glazing etc. alongside occupants’ 
occupancy and lifestyle priorities.
X X
Step-by-step Undertakes specific improvements with a sequential order over years or decades that 
depend on ‘trigger points’ such as the financial investment and occupant’s lifestyle in 
terms of acceptance of disruption or lifestyle changes. This requires a considered low-
carbon improvement plan to avoid missed opportunities and lock-in interventions. 
X
Measure-by-
measure
Undertakes improvements as arise from an isolated measure or system failure or life 
span replacement. This piecemeal approach does not consider the interaction between 
systems.
X
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2015), are mainly designed with new buildings in mind and 
not wholly aligned with the tasks, objectives and issues encoun-
tered in a retrofit process. The process of construction planning 
and management in retrofits is distinct from a new build as 
it involves different retrofit approaches that can have different 
time length planning (one-off/ over-time), managed by differ-
ent people (e.g. homeowner at the role of project manager), 
and do not necessarily follow a formal sequence of stages. Ex-
isting buildings are challenging as they are an assemblage of 
materials and systems, a series of past interventions that oc-
curred at different times, by different people, complying with 
different regulations and standards and users’ needs. Previous 
work (Topouzi, Killip et al. 2017, Topouzi, Killip et al. 2017) 
developed a retrofit-specific plan of work process with clear, 
sequential stages. 
Figure 1, shows the amended version of the RIBA Plan of 
Work (RIBA 2013), with the three additional key stages iden-
tified; in which process risk arise (Stage 0: Appraisal, Stage 5: 
Pre-Construction and Stage 9: Repair/maintenance). Within 
the early stages (Stage 0–Stage 4) of retrofit planning, impor-
tant retrofit decisions are made that determine the type (de-
gree of ambition in terms of energy saving), approach (e.g. 
whole-house, Fabric-first, Step-by-step etc.) and timing (one-
off or over-time) of the work. In a whole-house approach the 
sequence of works is planned following order of stages start-
ing at Stage 0. For the planning of a retrofit process, Appraisal 
(Stage 0) is a key stage as renovation-specific baseline issues 
and constraints are identified and formally assessed to inform 
follow up design choices. In the Fabric-first, Step-by-step, 
Room-by-room and Measure-by-measure approaches the 
work plan can bypass intermediate stages moving straight on 
to construction. For these cases the additional Stage 5, takes 
a similar approach to Stage 0 in which the existing condition 
(building envelope, systems and use) of the whole building is 
systematically assessed before works start. It also means that in 
cases where Preparation and Design stages were carried out, 
there is an opportunity to check for problems that are apparent 
only when construction work starts and cannot be identified by 
the diagnostic tests at Stage 0.
At the other end of the cycle, the, Post-construction /In-use 
stage (Stage 8), is vital in a retrofit process to ensure the quality 
of installation and actual operation. With this in mind, the ad-
ditional Stage 9 places emphasis on the whole retrofit cycle in 
which the building improvement is an ongoing process that in-
volves repair and maintenance and does not end at the delivery 
but will continue to alter building performance and shape the 
baseline conditions for further cycles of renovation planning 
and management.
Methodology
Our analysis used evidence from an extensive empirical data-
base of deep retrofit projects in the UK, combined with outputs 
from a previous systematic analysis of 26 cases (Topouzi 2015) 
(see Table  2), to identify factors (activities) that affect time 
(one-off/ over-time), planning (retrofit stages) and approach 
type (Whole-house, Fabric-first etc.) of a retrofit project. First 
the primary data was crosschecked and matched against other 
published data and ‘grey’ literature (secondary data sources) to 
expand understanding of key factors and observed effects (e.g. 
incorrect package of decisions and installation actions) and as-
sociated causes (e.g. choice of diagnostic techniques) within 
retrofit work stages. The retrofit-specific work plan (Figure 1) 
was then used as a guide to identify and map which causes 
and effects in a retrofit process are most acute. A chain of re-
lationships of causes/effects across work stages was analysed 
pointing to the trail of dominoes responsible for the perfor-
mance gap (e.g. a cause that brings about a related effect, that 
in turn this effect becomes a cause for the next effect, and that 
all causes lead to the final effect). The cause of those effects we 
have termed as ‘risks’. The frequency and impact of these causes 
gave the themes for key risks categories, which then distilled 
into a final set of three (Figure 21).
Using a three point narrative/numerical rating scale (Low/
Unlikely – 1; Medium – 2; High/Likely – 3), the set of three 
key process risk types assessed and mapped to the retrofit ap-
proaches. The criteria used for risk rating considered as Medi-
um the cases for instance in which despite all assessment tech-
niques carried out the lack of specific skills diminished their 
input quality; while High/Likely were rated the cases in which 
these activities were completely omitted.
1. The full list of references consulted can be supplied by the authors.
Figure 1. Renovation-specific plan of work and the start point for 
works of different retrofit approaches. Developed from Topouzi et 
al. 2017b.
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Results
The analysis presented here discusses the causes of risks in the 
management and planning of a retrofit process. Three key risks 
emerged: Assessment risks; Sequence risks; and Communica-
tion risks. Table 3 illustrates the types of risks that emerge in 
different retrofit approaches and work plan stages and contrib-
ute to the performance gap between design intent and actual 
performance. 
Assessment risks: are related to the type of diagnostic tech-
niques used to understand the building performance, the skills 
of people undertaking assessment and the time when assess-
ments are carried out. In the ‘whole-house’ approach, this 
type of risk is relatively low compared to the other retrofit ap-
proaches; when retrofit is planned as a one-off intervention 
the evaluation of the building condition is integrated into the 
overall planning at early and later work stages. However, in 
	
Figure 2. The approach used for the analysis of risks in multiple data sources.
Table 2. Example of the type of data used in the analysis of retrofit process risks.
Type Description Source
Pr
im
ar
y 
D
at
a 
se
t:
E
vi
d
en
ce
 b
as
ed
 d
at
a Retrofit for the Future (UK innovation project): large 
scale demonstration project of low carbon deep 
refits of low-rise social housing in the UK, (used 
dataset: Building information, semi-structured 
interviews, Post Occupancy Evaluation, projects 
planning documentation, in-situ metering/spot 
checks, 2 years physical and energy data, Post-
construction reviews)
Retrofit for the Future demonstration project (2009–
2013), Occupants’ interaction with low-carbon retrofitted 
homes and its impact on energy use (Topouzi 2015).
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y 
d
at
a:
R
ep
o
rt
s 
&
 p
u
b
lic
at
io
n
s Online data sources on retrofit case studies; 
publications and reports on buildings retrofit 
approaches, planning and management, regulation 
and standards in the UK and EU.
E.g. evidence from Superhomes homeowners 
on deep retrofits approaches and planning and 
coordination; retrofit approaches and Building 
Renovation passport examples. 
Superhomes database (Superhomes 2013); EVALOC 
project (Gupta, Eyre et al. 2015); Retrofit insights: 
perspectives for an emerging industry. (Institute 
for Sustainability 2012); Occupant-centred retrofit: 
engagement and communication. (Institute for 
Sustainability 2012); Retrofit strategies (Institute for 
Sustainability 2012); Residential retrofit: 20 case 
studies (Baeli 2013), etc.
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projects carried out ‘over-time’, risks appear when diagnostic 
technique type or timing have not been part of project planning 
and budget. For example when a major intervention like cavity 
wall insulation is followed by window replacement, or external 
wall insulation in a different part of the building, the differ-
ent measures can interact and require construction details (BSI 
2017) that include thermal insulation detailing around corners, 
junctions, edges. Diagnostic tests like thermal imaging and a 
test of the air permeability of the building envelope to identify 
key leakage locations need to be repeated to assess the building 
envelope performance ‘as-a-whole’. The degree of assessment 
risk in a project using a whole-house approach often arises be-
cause of the choice of an inadequate diagnostic techniques or a 
lack of skills in the people carrying out the assessment process. 
For example, Energy Performance Certificates (EPC) do not 
accurately reflect the real condition of the building fabric or 
miss out user’s special lifestyle requirements that are needed to 
inform the design brief intervention choices (e.g. MVHR in-
stallation vs occupant’s smoking habits and windows opening 
practices).  
When the ‘fabric-first’ approach is used, assessment risks are 
increased in specific stages of preparation, design and in-use 
especially when works are carried out ‘over time’ and techni-
cal and in-use problems may not be recorded accurately, or at 
all. This means that there is incomplete data to inform future 
interventions of combined systems that would need to perform 
as a whole (e.g. installation of MVHR or low carbon heating 
system with under floor heating can negatively impact upon 
loft and floor insulation and overall draught-proofing and air-
tightness).
Generally, assessment risks are higher in room-by-room, 
step-by-step and measure-by-measure approaches because 
these involve individual measures that are not planned with the 
whole building performance in mind. Diagnostic techniques 
that could shape design decisions are not repeated when ret-
rofit measures are implemented in stages over-time. In these 
approaches the techniques, assessment tools and diagnostic or 
problem solving skills of the team can vary significantly at dif-
ferent stages of a long-term retrofit project. The risk of selecting 
an incorrect package of measures, with installation decisions 
driven by the installer’s current knowledge has both a short 
term effect in the package of measure not achieving the desired 
energy performance. These decisions also produce a “lock-in” 
effect constraining future interventions (e.g. the choice of heat-
ing system needs to be reflected in later decisions on radiator 
sizing and insulation).
Repair/Maintenance is an important stage of high risk 
across all approaches. Regardless of the scale or duration of 
the retrofit intervention, there is a culture in the construc-
tion sector that project management ends at the delivery stage 
(Bordass and Leaman 2013). Thus building assessment proce-
dures are often overlooked entirely and final performance is 
not fed back into the project team for future learning (which 
would reduce future risks to energy performance on other 
projects). 
Sequence risks: these are related to the choice of managing 
the order of retrofit works in long and short term planning. 
Even in the case of one-off whole-house approach, short term 
planning actions can be carried out in the ‘wrong’ order due to 
insufficient management. For example, structural damage can 
occur to thermally highly insulated roofs when photovoltaic 
panels are installed at later stage, if the installers do not take 
into account the insulation present. This can result in reducing 
overall building fabric performance. In the other approaches, 
unplanned interventions, perhaps to solve unforeseen prob-
lems, can compromise building performance. For example, 
holes drilled in wall insulation to allow re-wiring can reduce 
airtightness and decrease thermal performance. In an optimal 
sequence, re-wiring would be carried out before wall insulation 
was installed. 
Communication risks: these are related to the communi-
cation methods (type, level/purpose, timing) that are used 
by different actors/roles involved in a retrofit process. In a 
whole-house approach poor communication between design-
ers, users and installers at design and in-use stage can lead 
to inappropriate choices of technology, installation failures 
or on-site problem solving that is disconnected from other 
building components, design and usability principles. It can 
also leave residents unable effectively use the equipment in 
their homes (In use phase). A typical example being hando-
ver information on smart heating controls and MVHR system 
provided by the installers that is too technical, with no dem-
onstration and explanation of combined systems principles. 
In room-by-room or measure-by-measure interventions the 
risk in communication is that roles and people involved vary 
over time, the interaction between different actors is limited 
or non-existent, and therefore information for systems that 
interact not provided. 
Communication risks include two important subcategories 
of risks that are relevant especially in over-time approaches. 
The first has to do with the assigned responsibilities and the co-
ordination of actors, which inherently involves fragmentation 
of roles affecting decision-making and construction project 
planning and management. The practice of sub-contracting 
measures and systems over time means that responsibility for 
overall performance does not sit with any individual. For exam-
ple, where walls are insulated at one time, and high specifica-
tion windows installed at another, neither the insulation install-
er or the windows specialist specifier might take responsibility 
for considering the effect of cold bridges between elements, 
leading to underperformance of the combination. Building us-
ers do not know who has responsibility for aftercare support 
for technical and operational problems of measures installed 
over-time.
Secondly, the opportunity for learning from the whole pro-
ject is lost because of its fragmentation over time. Findings 
from reality checks, diagnostic tests and monitoring/reported 
unsolved installation and operational failures are not inform-
ing on-going design or maintenance decisions, with construc-
tion teams missing learning loops from previous experience.
Table 3 shows that the total combined risk score of these 
three types of risks across stages is lower in one-off interven-
tions compared to over-time interventions. However, the large 
scale rollout of the one-off ‘whole house’ approach (EST 2009, 
TSB 2013, TSB 2014) is unrealistic for many private homeown-
ers because of the practical aspects of disruption and/or the un-
affordability of doing everything in a single investment (Energy 
Saving Trust 2010, Energy Saving Trust 2011). The evidence 
showed that it was common for this stage of renovation to lead 
a substantial performance gap, compared with design intent. 
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Discussion
Table 3 suggests that process risks of retrofit are always pre-
sent, indicating that some form of risk management is needed 
in all cases. Risks are not restricted to just one type, nor are 
they found solely or predominantly in a small number of work 
stages. The implication of this is that risk management needs to 
be integrated into retrofit works, whichever approach is taken, 
at all stages and across the assessment, sequencing and commu-
nication aspects of the retrofit. Even the least risky approach, 
the whole house approach, involves significant risk.
It is striking that the process risks are significantly greater for 
all approaches other than the ‘whole house’ approach. The rea-
sons for this are not always clear from the evidence especially 
for the over-time only approaches. However, some speculative 
explanations can be put forward for debate. Firstly, the integra-
tion of all the work into one project is consistent with having 
continuity of personnel. Not all the consultants, designers and 
contractors will remain throughout every project, but it seems 
reasonable to expect at least some continuity of aftercare sup-
port. We suggest that continuity of personnel is important for 
several reasons. Firstly, it provides institutional memory, so 
that even if documentation is incomplete or unclear, people 
can remember the decision-making process to fill in some of 
the gaps. Secondly, project teams inevitably develop a group 
dynamic, and individuals learn to expect certain responses 
(good, bad or neutral) from other team-members. The expec-
tation that colleague X will (or will not) do a good job on a 
given task can translate into informal strategies for supervision 
or monitoring – paying closer attention where problems can be 
expected, but paying less attention when a colleague has con-
sistently given excellent performance previously. And, thirdly, 
the unity of a single project means that all members of the team 
are working towards a common goal. They may perform their 
individual tasks more or less diligently, but the objective of the 
project needs to be a building’s performance as a whole.
In contrast, we suggest that the ‘over time’ approaches are 
more likely to lack institutional memory; to experience greater 
change in the team dynamic; and to be more prone to situations 
where the original goals may get lost, subverted, forgotten or 
mis-remembered. Where there is a time delay between phases 
of a retrofit, it seems legitimate to ask whether and how these 
risks can be mitigated.
Table 3. Types of risks of a retrofit process and the likelihood of risks within different work plan stages.
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The concept of a Building Renovation Passport is relevant 
here, as it is intended to provide a form of documentary conti-
nuity in situations where there is no continuity of personnel or 
project objectives. The passport idea is worthy of further devel-
opment and investigation, but we argue that it can only be suc-
cessful if each document is kept up-to-date and accurate, and 
if it is used effectively in the planning, design and implementa-
tion of later retrofit interventions. The passport may prove to 
be a useful tool, but attention needs to be paid to making sure 
that it is used, understood and accepted by those who work on 
retrofit projects.
In addition, the quality management processes currently 
being developed in the UK’s PAS2035 standard should be able 
to help reduce risks by identifying the qualification and skills 
needed at different project stages. The quality of management 
and project delivery is crucially important in retrofit.
Table 3 is a complex output of research – for each retrofit ap-
proach thirty different estimates of risk (by stage and by risk 
type) had to be evidenced. Particularly given that most compo-
nents were judged as high risk – it is worthwhile differentiating 
risk to this degree? We believe that it is – for example, the assess-
ment for the whole home approach shows where further efforts 
to reduce risk should be concentrated. Nevertheless, in future 
work it would be worth exploring the value of this approach with 
addition deep retrofit case studies in the UK and EU-wide (e.g. 
Energiesprong, cases using Building Renovation Passports).
Using a lens of potential risk analysis to examine retrofit 
projects allows us to propose future research to identify risk 
mitigation strategies. Initial ideas might be that retrofit co-ordi-
nation could mitigate the risks associated with communication 
and data/knowledge sharing for over time approaches. Docu-
mentation, such as the Building Passport, might provide a way 
of responding flexibly to new technologies/measures, lifestyle 
changes or policy strategies and incentives. A mitigation strat-
egy for assessment risks might be to carry out repeated assess-
ments in the key stages where there is a window of opportunity 
to fix installation issues and negatives impact of one measure 
upon another without building on the top of an existing prob-
lem or ignoring it. All of these ideas, and more, can be investi-
gated in future research.
Conclusions
We have proposed a structured way of identifying, categorising 
and understanding risks that lead to energy retrofit objectives 
not being achieved in practice. The profile of these risks varies 
throughout a project life cycle and we have mapped these onto 
the RIBA work plan. In addition, our analysis recognises that 
projects altering existing buildings have distinctive characteris-
tics specifically in terms the pre-existing condition of the build-
ing. We also identify five different retrofit approaches, which 
might be carried out “one off ” or “over time”. Clarity about the 
approach being taken helps a project team to be aware of the 
relevant risk profile of works and the potential impact on en-
ergy performance. Relevant mitigation strategies can then be 
identified and integrated into construction project management 
to help to reduce, and potentially eliminate, the energy perfor-
mance gap.
The complexity and variety of retrofit projects needs to be 
given much greater priority in policy and industry debates about 
the future of retrofit. These projects carry significant risks, which 
are distributed among all work stages, not restricted to only a 
sub-set. Getting retrofit right will involve sophisticated risk man-
agement strategies, which is likely to involve multiple innova-
tions: new documents (e.g. Building Passports), new practices 
(with implications for education and training). It will also involve 
further research: there is very little data describing the planning 
and management processes of retrofit projects, and the impact 
of planning and management decisions and behaviours on the 
energy performance of a building.
Stimulated by the title of the panel in which our paper is pre-
sented, we suggest that ‘Making building policies great again’ 
will need a profound change of culture in the ways retrofit 
works are planned and building works are documented and 
managed. Fortunately, new tools are being developed to help 
with this, but much more focus is needed on this hitherto ne-
glected aspect of deep retrofit.   
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ments of 30 %–50 %, while there are no common definitions 
in India and China (Shnapp, Sitjà et al. 2013). The deep retrofit 
case studies explored in this paper are in line with the Retrofit 
for the Future targets and as the term is defined in Topouzi 
(2015, pg. 11571158).
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Endnotes
Although the term ‘deep’ renovation/refurbishment/retrofit, is 
commonly used in the grey literature and buildings’ energy ef-
ficiency Directives, there is no EU-wide legal definition of the 
term ‘deep’ (Economidou 2019). The GBPN’s review of global 
use of deep’ renovation pinpoints that there is a regional vari-
ation in the term definition. The term is used to describe deep 
improvement of the building envelope focussing on heating, 
ventilating and hot water and use of low carbon technologies 
aiming to significant decrease of the energy consumption. For 
example in Europe, ‘deep” renovation implies a minimum of 
75 % energy savings, whereas in the U.S. it means improve-
